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Franke: Affirmative Action Programs

DEFINING THE PARAMETERS OF
PERMISSIBLE STATE AND
LOCAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
PROGRAMS
JANICE

I.

R.

FRANKE*

INTRODUCTION

In the 1989 case of Richmond v. Croson,l the United States
Supreme Court issued a decision 2 which has had a tremendous
impact on subsequent judicial evaluations of other public sector
affirmative action efforts, and hence also on the adoption and
structuring of state and local affirmative action programs. 3 One
significant factor about the Croson decision was that it was the
first time a majority of the Court set strict scrutiny as the standard of review for assessing the constitutionality of state and local race-based affirmative action endeavors.4 Despite this agreement as to the proper standard of review, however, there was no
• Assistant Professor of Business Law, Ohio State University. B.A. 1977 Smith College; J.D. 1983 Ohio State University School of Law.
1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Croson declared invalid a Richmond, Virginia ordinance setting aside 30 percent of the value of public construction contracts for minority owned or
controlled business enterprises.
2. There were six separate opinions (including two dissenting opinions) filed in the
case. Justice O'Connor wrote a plurality opinion, parts of which were joined by other
concurring Justices. A majority of six Justices determined that the Richmond set-aside
was unconstitutional. For a more thorough discussion of the case and the various opinions, see J. R. Franke, Richmond v. Croson: The Setting Aside of Set-Asides? 34 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 603 (1990).
3. The remainder of this article reviews the impact of Croson on subsequent judicial
evaluations of other public sector affirmative action programs. Regarding the impact of
Croson on states or municipalities trying to justify adoption of such programs, see Dorothy J. Gaiter, Racial Reviews, Court Ruling Makes Discrimination Studies A Hot New
Industry, WALL ST. J., August 13, 1993, at AI; Barbara Carmen, Report: Minority Contractors Wronged, City Shows Injustice to Gain Court OK of Corrective Action, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 10, 1992, at C1.
4. Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1731 (1989).
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majority agreement as to what exactly is necessary for an affirmative action program to pass muster under the strict scrutiny
standard. II This uncertainty has produced various apparently inconsistent outcomes in subsequent constitutional challenges of
different types of state and local affirmative action programs.
A.

A

SUMMARY REVIEW OF RICHMOND V. CROSON

At issue in the Croson case was a Richmond, Virginia ordinance requiring nonminority prime contractors to subcontract at
least thirty percent of the value of their contracts to minority
owned or controlled enterprises (MBEs).6 The ordinance closely
mimicked a set-aside program included by Congress in the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,7 which earlier had been upheld as a valid affirmative action effort.s The Richmond ordinance in Croson defined minority group members as Black,
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut citizens. It
imposed no additional requirement that a business have local
ties to be preferred under the ordinance. 9 The ordinance allowed
for a waiver of the set-aside requirement if a prime contractor
could show that reasonable efforts failed to locate a qualified
and willing MBE.lO The plan included a sunset provision causing
it to expire five years after its adoption. l l The Richmond City
Council adopted the plan after a public hearing in which testimony was presented which indicated that there was widespread
racial discrimination within the construction industry generally
and that less than one percent of the city's construction contracts had been awarded to minority businesses in the past five
years.12 The plan was challenged by a nonminority contractor
5. [d. at 1732; see also Franke, supra note 2.
6. For a fuller description of the underlying facts and the history of the Croson case,
see Franke, supra note 2.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6734 (1982).
8. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). This act required grantees of federal assistance to expend a minimum of ten percent of each grant on minority business
enterprises.
9. Croson, 488 U.S. at 478.
10. [d.
11. [d.
12. [d. at 479-80. Testimony offered by representatives of local contractors' associa-

tions indicated that they knew of no discrimination experienced or practiced by their
members. However, there was almost no minority membership in those associations. [d.
at 480.
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who was denied a waiver of the set-aside requirement. IS
The lower courts initially upheld the set-aside plan. 14 The
Fourth Circuit evaluated the plan under the guidance of the Supreme Court's review of Congress' set-aside program in Fullilove
v. Klutznick,III and found the plan valid since the plan was
adopted by a body competent to do so, the Council had adequate justification for concluding that remedial action was necessary, and the plan was reasonably tailored to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. IS The Supreme Court vacated that
decision and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its
intervening decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education. I7 On remand, the Fourth Circuit read Wygant as requiring
a state or local public entity's affirmative action efforts to be
based on a showing of past discrimination by the acting entity
and the means adopted to be narrowly tailored to remedy the
remaining effects of that discrimination, and concluded that the
Richmond plan failed to meet either requirement. IS
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's judgment. I9 Justice O'Connor wrote a plurality opinion, parts of
which gained majority support. Four Justices agreed that Congress' remedial affirmative action powers are broader and thus
subject to less stringent judicial review than similar measures
13. [d. at 483.

14. See Croson, 779 F.2d 181, 184, 188, 190-91 (4th Cir. 1985).
15. Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). The Fourth Circuit actually borrowed the interpretation of the various opinions in Fullilove from the Eleventh Circuit decision in
South Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Metropolitan Dade County,
Fla., 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984). The constitutional
requirements identified for race conscious remedial action were that the action was undertaken by a properly authorized body, that the race conscious action was based on an
adequate determination that such remedy was necessary to counteract the lingering effects of past discrimination, and that the mechanism was precisely fitted to that purpose.
448 U.S. at 467, 478, 489, 520-21; see Franke, supra note 2, at 606 n.23, 26-28.
16. Croson, 779 F.2d at 188, 190-91.
17. 478 U.S. 1016 (1986) (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (1986)). Wygant involved a
contract provision between a school board and the teachers' union permitting the lay-off
of more senior non minority teachers in order to preserve minority teachers' representation in the workforce. A plurality of the Court asserted that public entities undertaking
affirmative action steps must have a firm factual basis for believing that the remedial
action is necessary, and a majority of the Court found that the provision at issue unduly
burdened the rights of nonminority teachers. [d. at 274-78, 283-84, 292, 294-95.
18. Croson, 822 F.2d 1355, 1357-62 (4th Cir. 1987).
19. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989). For a fuller description of the
various Justice's opinions, see Franke, supra note 2, at 607-16.
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undertaken by state or local legislative bodies. 20 Five Justices
agreed that even remedial race-based classifications employed by
state or local governments are subject to strict scrutiny review.21
However, when attempting to articulate what evidence is necessary to justify the use of affirmative action and the degree of
freedom to be allowed the acting entity in implementing a program, no majority could agree on a set rule, and no opinion
stated a generally applicable formula. For example, Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
White and Kennedy stated that a significant statistical disparity
between available qualified minorities and the rate at which minorities participate in the relevant activity could give rise to an
inference of discriminatory exclusion, which in extreme cases
could justify a narrowly tailored affirmative action program. 22
These Justices also would allow affirmative relief based on a pattern of individual discriminatory acts, "if supported by appropriate statistical proof."23 The proffered measure of the sufficiency of the evidentiary base for an affirmative action program
20. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-91, 521. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, distinguished between Congress' remedial powers and state/
local remedial powers based upon Congress' broad powers to legislate for the national
welfare and to regulate commerce, and upon the Fourteenth Amendment's positive grant
of enforcement authority to Congress, as contrasted with its placement of limits on state
and local authority to take race-based action. Justice Scalia believes that Congress' remedial powers are fundamentally different than those of state and local governments he believes that state and local governments may only use race-based action to undo a
discriminatory system endemic to the government's operation. See also Franke, supra
note 2 at 608, 613. The Supreme Court affirmed this distinction in Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
Most lower federal courts have applied that distinction in subsequent reviews of
state and local affirmative action programs. See, e.g., Tennessee Asphalt Co. v. Farris,
942 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991) (affording more leeway to Congress' determination that remedial affirmative action was necessary, applied where state adopted federal set-aside
without independent findings of local effects of discrimination under Fullilove standard);
Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fielder, 922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2261 (1991). To the extent that the state was acting as an agent of the federal government in granting preferential treatment to MBEs, under Fullilove, specific local findings of discrimination are not necessary to sustain the state's adherence to the federal
program, though state application of the preference to non-federally funded projects
needed independent justification under Croson.
21. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 520. Justice Scalia would not permit state and local
governments to engage in race-based affirmative action except where necessary to dismantle a discriminatory system operated by the government entity. [d. at 521.
22. [d. at 509. The failure of the statistical evidence in the case of the Richmond
ordinance lay in the fact the there was no appropriate comparison to the number of
qualified MBEs available for local contracting work. [d. at 510.
23. [d. at 509.
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is that the evidence is sufficient to define the scope of the injury
and the extent of the remedy needed. 24 At one extreme, Justice
Scalia would not permit state and local race-based remedial programs except where race-based classifications are necessary to
undo a discriminatory system maintained by the acting entity.211
On the other hand, Justice Stevens would not necessarily require
any evidence of past discrimination to justify affirmative action,
because he views the goal of promoting diversity alone as valid
in some circumstances. 26
In the case of the Richmond ordinance, conclusory statements about the existence of discrimination in the construction
industry generally and the statistical disparity between the
number of contracts awarded to MBEs and the proportionate
representation of minorities in the general population were
deemed inadequate to establish the existence of discrimination
in the Richmond public construction industry sufficient to warrant race-based remedial relief. 27 Furthermore, the absence of
any evidence of past discrimination against protected groups
other than Blacks, and extension of the preference to MBEs nationwide, the Council's failure to consider race-neutral mechanisms, and use of a rigid quota apparently tied only to minority
representation in the general population, were found to undermine the claim of remedial motivation. 28
From the opinions forging the majority, which applied the
strict scrutiny standard to the Richmond ordinance, some guiding principles can be articulated. First, remedial affirmative ac24. [d. at 510.
25. [d. at 521.
26. [d. at 511 n.1. The newly appointed Justice to the Supreme Court, Ruth Bader

Ginsburg, agrees with Justice Stevens that remedying past discrimination is not the only
basis for affirmative action. See O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 963 F.2d
420, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg concurring). Justice Marshall, joined by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun, (dissenting), would not subject remedial affirmative action programs to strict scrutiny. Croson, 488 U.S. at 535.
27. See id. at 498-500. Justice O'Connor maintained that a generalized claim of past
discrimination in an industry fails to provide appropriate guidance for defining the permissible scope of relief. [d. at 505. Furthermore, she refused to permit an inference that
racial rather than race-neutral factors accounted for the gross disparity between the percentage of minorities in the Richmond population (50%) and the percentage of public
contracts that had been awarded to MBEs over the past five years (0.67%). [d. at 501,
503.
28. See id. at 506.
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tion is allowable only where there is at least some concrete evidence of local or regional discriminatory impact identifiably or
inferably tied to past or ongoing private or governmental action.
Second, the remedy undertaken must be linked specifically to
group(s) suffering the identified discriminatory effects and must
not unduly burden members of the majority group.29
B.

CROSON'S INFLUENCE ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION REVIEW

Various lower federal courts have purported to apply the
Croson analysis in reviewing other public sector affirmative action efforts, primarily set-aside programs and minority employment preferences. Adoption of the Richmond ordinance was
deemed to produce a constitutionally unacceptable local affirmative action program, though the Court also indicated that state
and local use of race-based affirmative action is permissible
under appropriate circumstances. 3o In evaluating these other affirmative action programs under Croson, the important points
for comparison are the factual record supporting the acting entity's determination that present effects of past discrimination
persist and the degree of specificity exercised by the entity in
formulating a mechanism to address the discriminatory effects.
This article examines what passes muster under these points by
examining the outcomes in various cases. In conjunction with
this, the author seeks to explain the apparent variation in approval rates for the two types of state and local affirmative action programs examined.
II. FEDERAL COURTS' APPLICATIONS OF THE CROSON
ANAL YSIS: APPLICATION IN OTHER SET -ASIDE
CONTEXTS
The Croson decision raised some concerns about the viability of state and local set-aside programs, and prompted some
very different scholarly opinions about the effects of the decision. 31 However, despite the natural variations between the
29. See Franke, supra note 2, at 626.
30. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 509, 511, 528; and Franke, supra note 2, at n.6.
31. See, e.g., Joint Statement, Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative
Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989); Charles
Fried, Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to the
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records supporting affirmative action plans and the mechanics of
the programs themselves, review and comparison of different
courts' applications of Croson produces some useful insights as
to which set-aside programs will survive strict scrutiny under
the Constitution.
In O'Donnell Construction Co. v. District of Columbia,32 the
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the
District's Minority Contracting Act. 33 The act, in its amended
version, imposed on all District agencies a goal of awarding
thirty-five percent of the value of construction contracts to local
MBEs.34 Minority groups included Black Americans, Native
Americans, Asian Americans, Pacific Islander Americans, and
Hispanic Americans economically and socially disadvantaged
due to membership in these groups because of historical discrimination. 31i The Minority Business Opportunity Commission,
charged with implementation of the Act, established a "sheltered market" whereby certain contracts were set-aside for limited bidding competition among MBEs.36 The Commission also
had the discretion to attempt to increase minority participation
by other means such as waiver of bonding requirements and division of large contracts into smaller ones. 37
The evidence of prior discrimination relied upon in enacting
the original set-aside included some informal data indicating
that approximately three hundred MBEs were operating in the
District in 1974, and data for a subset of those MBEs showed
that they performed approximately five percent of the total (private and public) local construction contracts. 3S Extrapolating
Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155 (1989); Scholars' Reply to Professor Fried, 99
YALE L.J. 163 (1989).
32. O'Donnell Contr. Co., 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992). This decision reversed a
denial of a preliminary injunction by the District Court. See O'Donnell Constr. Co., 762
F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1991).
33. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1141 to 1-1151 (1992).
34. O'Donnell Constr. Co., 963 F.2d at 422.
35. Id. MBEs had to be certified by the Commission in order to participate in the
sheltered market bidding. Id.
36. Id. MBEs were permitted to participate in all regular non-sheltered contracts as
well. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 425-26. Additionally, some anecdotal testimony of individual experiences
of discrimination were considered in the enactment process. All evidence of discrimination apparently focused on discrimination against Blacks. Id. at 427.
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from this information on the availability of qualified MBEs, and
analyzing MBE usage versus availability for the Department of
General Services, it was estimated that MBEs could perform
thirty-four percent of that department's construction contracts
but that only 3.4 percent of the department's construction expenditures had been going to MBEs.39 This estimate apparently
provided the rationale for concluding that a twenty-five percent
goal was reasonable. 40 In 1983, the Act was amended without
formal consideration of additional evidence. The definition of
minorities favored was narrowed to include only those MBEs
with a place of business within the District, and the MBE participation goal was raised to thirty-five percent.41
The court found the D.C. set-aside defective under both
prongs of Croson. The court rejected the statistics proffered as
evidence of discrimination, rather than MBEs' focus on other
types of contracts, especially in light of the fact that much of the
anecdotal testimony related to difficulties encountered by MBEs
that were not directly race-related. 42 The fact that no additional
evidence was considered in raising the goal to thirty-five percent
in 1983, the failure to produce any evidence of discrimination
against protected groups other than Blacks, and the reliance on
evidence including information relating to MBEs outside of the
District, coupled with the failure to include a sunset provision in
the amended act, caused the court to conclude that the plan was
not narrowly tailored to address identified effects of past
discrimination. 43
A district court within the Second Circuit was faced with a
39. [d. at 426.
40. [d. Using the "rule of thumb" that surety bond rating procedures usually permit

doubling of the previous year's production, the Council considered that MBEs actually
had the capability to perform 68 percent of these construction contracts. [d.
41. [d. at 427-28. The sunset provision included in the original act was not included
in the amended act. [d. at 428.
42. Parroting Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson, 488 U.S. at 503, the court asserted that many non-discriminatory reasons could explain the disparity between the
percentages of MBEs participating in public construction contracts and the overall percentages of MBEs. The court also pointed to other statistics showing that a much higher
percent of some types of non-construction contracts had been awarded to MBEs by the
Department of General Services. O'Donnell Constr. Co., 963 F.2d at 426. Finally, the
court refused to credit testimony by MBEs regarding such 'things as difficulty meeting
bonding requirements as demonstrating race-specific discrimination. [d. at 427.
43. [d. at 427-28.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss2/3

8

Franke: Affirmative Action Programs

1994]

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROGRAMS

395

challenge to the renewal of a successful set-aside program in Associated General Contractors v. New Haven. 44 That case involved a set-aside program favoring disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs), where minorities were rebuttably presumed to
be disadvantaged.41~ During the time period of the original setaside program female and minority (combined) participation in
city construction contracts rose from less than one percent to
twenty-five percent. 46 In 1989, as a basis for renewing the program, the city conducted studies of the local construction industry, finding evidence of long standing discrimination, inability of
race-neutral measures to end the discrimination, a substantial
lack of MBE participation in commercial contracts without setasides, and confirmed the effectiveness of the current set-aside
program in increasing MBE participation, all based on testimony from representatives of MBEs and WBEs.47 However, the
court found this anecdotal evidence, standing alone, insufficient
to support a claim that renewal of the set-aside was necessary to
remedy continuing effects of discrimination. The court did indicate that the city might have met that burden by showing that
removal of the set-aside would likely significantly decrease MBE
participation with evidence showing a statistical disparity between MBE availability and MBE participation in the local private construction arena;48 Finally, failure to document discrimination against any "disadvantaged" business other than
disadvantage based on race was deemed to render the program
overinclusive, and thus not appropriately tailored to its asserted
remedial purpose. 49

In Main Line Paving Co. v. Board of Education, a district
44. Assoc. General Contractors, 791 F. Supp. 941 (D. Conn. 1992).
45. [d. at 942. This program, like those of many of the states and localities with
MBE programs also had a set-aside for women-owned or controlled enterprises (WBEs),
which typically are also subject to challenge for violation of equal protection principles.
See, e.g., Main Line Paving Co. v. Board of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1989);
Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991). However, it is beyond the
scope of this article to analyze the challenges to WBE programs. Many courts have acknowledged that classifications based on sex have been subject to a lesser, intermediate
degree of constitutional scrutiny, and that this intermediate standard would also carry
over into review of gender based affirmative action. Associated Gen. Contractors, 791 F.
Supp. at 942.
46. [d. at 943.
47. [d. at 945.
48. [d. at 945-47.
49. [d. at 948.
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court in Pennsylvania reviewed a facial challenge to the Philadelphia School Board's MBE set-aside for construction contracts. IIO The set-aside policy required contractors to subcontract
at least fifteen percent of the contract value to MBEs, or provide
a written request for waiver reciting the reasons that a MBE
could not be found or used on the particular contract. III Adoption of the policy was prompted by investigation of MBE complaints which showed that nonminority contractors had failed to
subcontract to low bidding MBEs for pre textual reasons.1I2 Additionally, the Board found that its use of "bidders lists" which
included very few MBEs, a poor attitude of its employees toward disseminating bidding information to new participants,
and practices such as imposition of high bonding requirements,
limited minority participation, accounting for the award of only
0.5 percent of contracts to MBEs in 1982-83. 113 Here, the court
found the evidentiary basis for the program too general, since it
related largely to race-neutral practices, and the remedy overbroad in that it did not provide for an individualized determination that those benefiting under the plan were victims of past
discrimination and it failed to consider race-neutral alternative
measures. 1I4
A district court in Maryland overturned the Minority Procurement Policy implemented by a state administrative agency
in Concrete General v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission. 1I1I The policy, adopted by legislative resolution, set a
twenty-five percent goal for minority participation in agency
50. Main Line Paving Co., 725 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1989). This program also
involved a WBE set-aside. See supra note 45.
51. [d. at 1352 (stipulation of facts). A MBE prime contractor could fulfill this requirement by performing at least 15 percent of the contract itself. [d.
52. [d. at 1354.
53. [d. at 1354-55. The Board had previously adopted a small scale set-aside policy,
and MBEs complained that they were not able to effectively participate in the program
because they were not getting necessary bidding information from Board employees. [d.
The Board was also aware of findings by the City Council relied upon to enact a city setaside program. [d.
54. [d. at 1361-62. The court reasoned that race-neutral alternatives, such as abandonment of bidders lists and lowering of bonding requirements, must be considered first
to minimize the burden on nonminorities. The court also noted that few waiver requests
had been granted. [d. at 1362.
55. Concrete General, 779 F. Supp. 370 (D. Md. 1991). The policy was challenged as
applied to impose MBE restricted bidding on a particular contract, thus denying nonminority contractors any chance to participate. [d. at 373, 382.
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contracts. 56 Revised in 1987, the policy listed six mechanisms
available to be used to increase MBE participation: 1) require
contractors to subcontract at least 10 percent of the value of the
contract to MBEs; 2) accept MBE bids that are within 10 percent of the lowest overall bid; 3) employ MBE restricted bidding; 4) negotiate contracts directly with MBEs; 5) waive bonding and insurance requirements for MBEs; and 6) waive
experience requirements for MBEs.57 Under the policy Blacks,
Hispanics, American Indians, Alaskan natives, Asians, Pacific Islanders, women, and physically or mentally disabled persons,
without geographical limitation, were recognized as minorities. 58
The policy did not include a sunset provision, though it did provide for annual review. 59
The underlying record supporting adoption of the policy
was not well developed. The department had noted that it had a
list of contracting firms, 6.54 percent of which were MBEs, but
that only 3 percent of its contract dollars were granted to
MBEs.60 There was some other statistical and anecdotal evidence of discrimination in the award of state contracts, but the
court deemed the record incomplete for resolution by summary
judgment. 6} However, the court did resolve the complaint on the
basis of the policy's overinclusiveness: the policy benefitted
groups against which no evidence of past discrimination had
been offered. It imposed no local geographic limits for the preference,62 and the Commission offered no evidence that it considered the least intrusive means for achieving its goa1. 63 In addition, the policy had no individual waiver or general termination
56. [d. at 371. The court concluded that the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission exceeded the scope of its legislative authority in adopting the Minority Procurement Policy, though it went on to evaluate the constitutional issues. [d. at 374-77.
57. [d. at 371-72. The mechanism to be used was to be selected in order to maximize
present awards to MBEs and future participation of MBEs, minimize interference with
the efficient operation of the agency, and generally maximize the goals of the policy. [d.
at 372.
58. [d.
59. [d.

60. Concrete General, 779 F. Supp. at 378.
61. [d.
62. [d. at 379. Even though the policy, as applied here, benefitted a local Black busi-

ness, the court found the overinclusiveness contrary to the permissible intention of remedying identified effects of past discrimination. [d.
63. [d. at 380-81. The Commission offered no justification for its decision to use
restricted bidding rather than the less intrusive alternatives such as waiver of bonding,
insurance, or experience requirements for MBEs. [d.
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provisions,64 and the overall MBE participation goal set at 25
percent was focused on general population figures and substantially exceeded the percentage of available qualified MBEs.611

F. Buddie Contracting Co. v. City of Elyria, Ohio 66 involved
a challenge to a municipal MBE set-aside adopted for the purposes of granting more meaningful and representative participation in city contracts for minorities and women. The set-aside
sought to avoid future discrimination against these groups, to
promote the city's general welfare by encouraging the establishment and expansion of MBEs, to stabilize the economy, and to
preserve employment opportunities. 67 Pre-enactment hearings
conducted by the city had not disclosed past discrimination
against MBEs in the award of city contracts. 6S The program
benefitted MBEs certified by the city, primarily on the basis of
membership in one of the following groups: Blacks, Hispanics,
Asians, and American Indians. 69 Percentage MBE subcontracting goals were set by type of contract and ranged from three to
fourteen percent, though a partial or total waiver was available
if sufficient qualified MBEs could not be located. 70 Failure to
base the program on a finding of past or present discrimination
in the award of city contracts, as well as failure to consider raceneutral means to pursue the city's goal were fatal to this
program. 71
The Seventh Circuit reviewed a challenge 72 to a state program setting aside certain state funded highway contracts for
DBEs,73 which was merely an extension of the federally man64. Id. at 381. The court deemed this evidence that the policy was not intended to
help MBEs overcome the effects of past discrimination. Id.
65. Id. at 382.
66. F. Buddie Contracting Co., 773 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ohio 1991).
67. Id. at 1022. The challenge was brought by a contractor whose bid was rejected
for failure to comply with the MBE requirement. The city program also included a WBE
set-aside. Id. at 1020.
68. Id. at 1022.
69. Id. at 1022-23.
70. Id. at 1023. There was a right to appeal the denial of a waiver. Id.
71. F. Buddie Contracting Co., 773 F. Supp. at 1031-32. The availability of a waiver
did not save the program. Id.
72. Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fielder, 922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
111 S.Ct. 2261 (1991).
73. Even though the program benefitted disadvantaged businesses as opposed to minority businesses, the rebuttable presumption that minorities are disadvantaged was
deemed to render this a race-based preference, subject to strict scrutiny review. Milwau-
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dated highway set-aside under the Surface Transportation Uniform Relocation Assistance Act74 to non-federally funded contracts. Here, absent an independent evidentiary basis for the
state's conclusion that the set-aside was needed to' remedy the
effects of past discrimination regarding the construction industry within the state, the sta~e's independent application of the
federal program could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.7~
The Ninth Circuit has reviewed two local set-aside programs since the announcement of the Croson decision. In the
first case, Coral Construction Co. u. King County,76 the plan was
amended after the Croson decision. Minority businesses included under the plan were those certified by the state as owned
or controlled by Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, American Indians,
and Alaskan natives." The plan provided for a percentage preference for bidders using MBEs on small contracts,78 and set contract-specific MBE subcontracting set-asides for larger contracts. 79 A reduction in set-aside levels or complete waiver of the
set-aside requirement was available where it was demonstrated
that it was not feasible to find MBEs or that use of MBEs would
unreasonably increase costs. 80 The evidence initially relied upon
kee Pavers Ass'n, 922 F.2d at 421.
74. Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 132 (1987).
75. Milwaukee Pavers Ass'n, 922 F.2d at 421. See also supra note 20 and accompanying text. The same issue and outcome was involved in the Eleventh Circuit case, H.K.
Porter Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 975 F.2d 762 (11th Cir. 1992).
76. Coral Canstr. Co., 941 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 1991). There were some further
amendments to the plan in 1990, which were not relevant to this review. [d. at 915.
77. [d. at 914. The 1989 amendments required the County Office of Civil Rights and
Compliance to monitor implementation of the plan to ensure that no particular group
was unfairly or disproportionately favored, and that the plan was not in effect any longer
than necessary. The plan also had a set-aside for similarly certified female owned or
controlled businesses. [d.
78. This provision allowed a preference for a contractor who was within five percent
of the lowest overall bid, if that contractor was using an MBE, for contracts up to
$10,000. The 1989 amendments to the plan provided for a flexible percentage MBE subcontracting figure to be set on a case by case basis. [d. at 914-15.
79. The program also permitted use of the percentage preference method for large
contracts if it was deemed the best way to get increased MBE participation. In this case,
the percentage preference method had been used to award a contract involving more
than $10,000 to the second lowest bidder, a minority contractor. The 1989 amendments
applied the MBE subcontracting set-aside to all contractors, including MBEs, unless the
MBE contractor was performing at least 25 percent of the contract work itself. Coral,
941 F.2d at 914. The plan also included some race-neutral mechanisms such as provision
of training and information access for businesses wishing to bid on county contracts. [d.
at 923.
80. [d. at 914.
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to demonstrate the need for remedial relief consisted of more
than 700 pages of affidavits from fifty-seven women and minorities documenting specific instances of discrimination in the local
construction industry, covering a broad spectrum of the covered
groups and including experiences of discrimination on public
projects. 81 Though anecdotal evidence alone was 'deemed insufficient to support a finding that affirmative action was necessary,
the court asserted that statistical evidence gathered during the
1990 amendment process also could be considered under strict
scrutiny analysis. 82 Design of the remedy here seemed to be appropriately narrowed. Some race-neutral activities included with
the set-aside provisions and individual contract set-aside determinations, together with the availability of the waiver, made the
plan flexible. 8s However, further analysis of the record was
deemed necessary to determine whether the benefits of the plan
were defined by MBEs experiences of discrimination specifically
in King County.84

Associated General Contractors of California u. Coalition
involved an MBE bidding preference on city contracts. 81i After
an earlier MBE bid preference had been overturned, the city undertook an investigation regarding continued discrimination in
city contracting, receiving testimony from forty-two witnesses
and written submissions from 127 others, and additionally held
ten public hearings on the matter.86 A study commissioned by
81. Id. at 917-19.
82. Id. at 919-20. There must be some evidence of prior discrimination at the time
of enactment to provide some support for the remedy and to ensure that the remedy is
narrowly tailored to address that discrimination. Id. at 920. Here, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the challengers and remanded
that portion of the case for full consideration of the issue of whether the county had, in
light of all the evidence, a compelling interest in addressing the lingering effects of past
discrimination. Id. at 921-22.
83. Id. at 923-24.
84. Id. at 925. The plan appeared to be overbroad in that it allowed for certification
of MBEs if the business suffered from discrimination in its locale (not necessarily King
County). The appropriate issue was defined not as the location of the business, but
whether it has suffered discrimination in King County. If the benefits are defined by
findings that a business, local or not, has suffered the effects of discrimination when it
tried to do business in King County, the plan would not be overbroad. Id. The summary
judgment granted to challengers on the issue of the plan's overbreadth also was reversed.
Id. at 926.
85. Assoc. General Contractors of California, 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991). The
program also granted a preference to WBEs and locally owned businesses (LBEs).
86. Id. at 1404. The investigation was begun before the Croson decision, and the
public hearings were held after Croson. Id.
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the city showed large statistical disparities between the availability of MBEs and the amount of city contracting awarded to
MBEs.87 The 1989 ordinance granted bid preferences to prime
contractors who are members of groups found to be disadvantaged by previous bid practices, specifically granting a 5 percent
bid preference for MBEs, defined as disadvantaged businesses
owned by Blacks, Latinos and Asians. 88 Local businesses were
granted an additional (and cumulative) five percent preference. 89
The benefits of the bid preference were extended to other enterprises engaged in a joint venture with an MBE, where MBE participation was at least thirty-five percent. 90 Here, the court
found that the city had made the requisite detailed findings of
prior discrimination within its borders to justify a race-based
remedy, and that the program was narrowly tailored because it
was sufficiently flexible, focused on identified prior discrimination and economically disadvantaged businesses, and imposed
only a slight burden on others.91
The Eleventh Circuit visited the post-Croson set-aside issue
in Cone Corp. u. Florida Department of Transportation. 92 In
that case, Hillsborough County enacted an MBE program establishing a goal of awarding twenty-five percent of the value of
county construction contracts to economically disadvantaged
MBEs.93 MBE goals for individual projects, up to fifty percent,
were to be set based on the number of available eligible MBEs.94
The plan provided for a pre-bid conference for discussion of
MBE requirements, and waiver of the goal prior to advertise87. [d. at 1414. The study showed MBE availability at 49.5 percent, but contract
dollar participation by MBEs at only 11.1 percent.
88. [d. at 1404. Economically disadvantaged businesses were defined as those having
average gross receipts that did not exceed fourteen million for the prior three years. [d.
89. Assoc. General Contractors of California, 950 F.2d at 1404. Thus, local MBEs
received a 10 percent bid preference.
90. [d. at 1404.
91. [d. at 1416-18. Specifically, the use of a bid preference rather than a quota, the
definition of beneficiaries on the basis of experience of prior bid discrimination, the ability of nonminority contractors to participate via the joint venture option, and the limited
geographic scope of the preference were noted by the court. [d.
92. Cone Corp., 908 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1990). In a later review of this case, the
Eleventh Circuit determined that the challenger did not have standing. Cone Corp., 921
F.2d 1190 (11th Cir. 1991). The U.S. Supreme Court has since reversed the Eleventh
Circuit's position on standing. See Northeastern Fla. Ch. of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors
of Am. v. Jacksonville, Florida, 61 U.S.L.W. 4626 (June 15, 1993).
93. [d. at 910.
94. [d.
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ment if deemed to be injurious to health, safety, or welfare (including financial concerns.}911 Enactment of this plan followed a
long term, but unsuccessful, attempt by the county to increase
MBE participation in public contracts under a voluntary affirmative action program. 96 At the time, statistics compiled over a six
year period in the local area showed that though MBEs made up
twelve percent of the local contractor population, only 6.3 percent of county contracts (6.6 percent of contract value) went to
MBEs, and most of that was accounted for in one contract. 97
Supplemented by numerous individual complaints of discrimination in county procurement, the court deemed this record sufficient to indicate a prima facie case of discrimination, thus justifying the race-specific remedy.98 Furthermore, the county's
attempt to use a voluntary program, the individual and flexible
setting of goals, the availability of waiver, and the targeting of
groups locally represented and most likely still suffering the effects of past discrimination were found to adequately tailor the
remedy to redress the identified problem. 99
III.

LESSONS REGARDING SET-ASIDE PROGRAMS

In general, state and local set-aside programs have not fared
well under judicial application of the Croson standards. Part of
the problem is due to the fact that the factual record underlying
adoption of the Richmond ordinance was poorly defined,I°o lead95. [d. at 910-11. Working with the three lowest bids, the County Administrator was
to check compliance with the MBE goal and/or the contractor's good faith efforts to
comply with the goal. If the low bidder was deemed not responsive to the MBE goal, s/he
was permitted to protest that finding. If still deemed not responsive, and the next lowest
bid was either $100,000 or fifteen percent higher than the low bid, the MBE goal was to
be waived. Otherwise, the County Administrator had discretion to make a final decision.
[d. at 911.
96. [d. at 909-10. After initial adoption of the voluntary program in 1978, studies in
1981 and 1984 indicated that minorities still were significantly underrepresented in
awards of county contracts. [d. at 910.
97. Cone Corp., 908 F.2d at 915. 7.89 percent of purchase orders and 1.22 percent of
total county expenditures went to MBEs. [d.
98. [d.
99. [d. at 916-17.

100. Because Richmond City Council adopted the ordinance at a time when Fulliloue was considered to define the standard under which public sector affirmative action
programs could be adopted, and because the ordinance mimicked the Congressional setaside upheld under constitutional challenge in Fulliloue, the Council apparently referred
loosely or by inference to evidence of discrimination justifying the remedial program,
without assembling a clear record of how that "general" discrimination specifically im-
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ing to very different interpretations of its breadth and depth.
For instance, the majority supporting Justice O'Connor's analysis of the evidence in Croson eschewed the references to Richmond's well-documented and extensive history of racial discrimination in general because of the Council's failure to document a
direct link between that history and the current experiences of
local minority contractors. lOl On that basis, O'Connor refused to
infer that discrimination accounted for the gross underrepresentation of minorities in the construction industry and in
local contractors' associations, despite an overwhelming statistical disparity.lo2 In contrast, Justice Marshall, joined by two
others in his dissent, decried the majority's failure to evaluate
the record in its proper historical context.103 He criticized the
majority's notion that discrimination and its effects could be
separated out into discrete actions with discrete, easily identifiable reactions. lo4 Marshall's evaluation of the record accepted
evidence of discrimination in the construction industry nationally and a general pattern of racial discrimination locally as sufficiently probative of a problem in the local industry to justify a
race-specific remedy. Because the evidentiary basis for adoption
of the Richmond ordinance was at least arguably much stronger
than it was credited to be by the majority, other courts evaluating similar records, even where the acting body has gone farther
in establishing a link between the "general discrimination" and
the current status of minorities, may devalue those records, declining to fully credit the strength of evidence of discrimination
having a tangential link to present experiences of local
minorities.
Compounded by the Croson majority's viewpoint, courts
have been reluctant to approve race-specific remedies that have
not been specifically linked to direct effects of racial discrimination. lOIl For example, courts have declined to recognize bonding
pacted on MBEs within the local construction industry.
101. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
102. [d. at 501, 503.
103. [d. at 529-30.
104. [d. at 530-32. Marshall also pointed out that where discriminatory exclusion
from a given area is alleged, comparison of minority participation in that area to minority representation in the general (local) population is the only relevant comparison to be
made. [d. at 529.
105. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
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and insurance requirements, experience requirements and other
"race-neutral" factors in the contracting hade as having greater
adverse impact on minorities because of historic discrimination. loa Thus, set-aside programs have been overturned because
the acting entity drafted its program on the presumption that
particular groups have suffered from general opportunity barriers because of membership in a minority group rather than focusing on documentation of the disparate impact evident on the
basis of apparently race-neutral factors. lo7
Another recurrent problem with state and local set-asides is
linked to the inclusion of racial groups other than Blacks. Again,
in drafting the Richmond ordinance, the Council adopted Congress' definition of minorities, probably without much thought
about its inclusion of groups not represented locally. !Os Generally, in adoption of non-discrimination or affirmative action policies, there is a tendency to include all groups of arguably marginal representation or status - most bodies acting on such
policies do not want to be accused of favoring one group over
another. However, while the experience of discrimination for
Blacks in the United States was/is pervasive and largely consistent across the nation, and fairly well acknowledged, experiences
of discrimination by other racial groups are often perceived as
more regional and less prevalent. Thus, in assembling the evidence of past discrimination, policymakers have tended to focus
on evidence relating to the experience of Blacks. lo9 Set-asides including other racial groups are then subject to charges of
overbreadth. llo
Examination of the unique features of those set-aside programs which have passed muster under strict scrutiny analysis,
106. See, e.g., Main Line Paving Co. v. Bd. of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 1349, 1354, 136162 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
107. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C.
Cir. 1992). This is reminiscent of the Supreme Court's treatment of the disparate impact
claim in the Wards Cove case, where it denied relief to disparate impact claimants because they failed to identify the specific employment practice(s) that operated to disproportionately exclude minorities. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989).
108. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 528.
109. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); Associated Gen. Contractors v. New Haven, 791 F. Supp. 941, 948 (D. Conn.
1992).
110. [d.
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and contrasting them with features of unsuccessful programs, offers refinement to the lessons of Croson in defining the perimeter within which constitutionally permissible set-aside programs
fall. First, the acting entity must be concerned with development of the record to support the conclusion that race-based affirmative action is a necessary response to continuing effects of
discrimination. A statistical record of significant disparities between local minority representation in a particular arena and
minorities instantly available l l l to participate in the field is required. 1I2 Even a strong statistical record will generally need
supplementation with anecdotal evidence of individual experiences of discrimination.1l3 This type of evidence should provide
the link between membership in a particular racial group and an
experience of discrimination on what appears to be a race-neutral factor, such as obtaining insurance, price quotes, etc. 1I4 To
the extent that the set-aside covers racial groups other than
Blacks, at least some documentation, both statistical and anecdotal, must relate to discrimination against those groups.l1II
Second, the statistical record must be the basis for the determination of goals for minority representation; goals must be
set in reasonable relation to the number of locally available
qualified minorities, and thus should also be flexible and variable in different contexts. lIS Furthermore, the benefits of the program should be limited to those minority entities which have ex111. This defines minority entities currently in existence and locally available to
participate in the subject activity.
112. See, e.g., Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 9lO, 917-19 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that even a large, specific anecdotal record of local discrimination in public contracting deemed insufficient to support need for remedial program without subsequent statistical substantiation).
113. Failure of the Richmond ordinance lay, in part, in the failure to document individual experiences of discrimination in the local construction industry. In fact, representatives of the local contractors' associations, all of which had virtually no minority membership, testified that they were not aware of discrimination practiced locally. However,
no testimony was obtained from local MBEs. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 479-80.
114. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. New Haven, 791 F. Supp. 941, 945-47
(D. Conn. 1992) (inferring that proffered anecdotal evidence, together with related statistical disparity (lacking in the record) would have been enough to justify renewal of the
set-aside program}.
115. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
116. Cf. Concrete Gen. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 779 F. Supp.
370, 382 (D. Md. 1991) (striking down MBE participation goals set in relation to general
population figures), and Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Coalition, 950 F.2d 1401,
1414, 1416-17 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding flexible MBE preference, tied to those MBEs
having previously received a lower than expected percentage of contracts).
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perienced the effects of local discrimination.1l7 In this vein also,
the acting body must evaluate race-neutral alternatives to a setaside, and explain a conclusion that such alternatives would not
be effective in eliminating the continuing effects of discrimination.1I8 Waiver of the set-aside must be available upon a showing
that qualified minorities are not available, that adherence to the
set-aside is too costly, or that use of a particular minority entity
is not justified on the basis of experiences of discrimination. 119
Some mechanism for ensuring that the set-aside is abandoned
when its goals have been reached must be included. 120 Finally,
the set-aside must limit its negative impact on nonminorities. 121
IV.

APPLICATION IN EMPLOYMENT SETTINGS

In public employment settings, affirmative action' programs
are often, though not always, linked to settlements of individual
or class discrimination lawsuits. In such cases, there is at least
some allegation of misconduct by the acting entity, although a
formal record substantiating those allegations may be lacking or
incomplete, depending upon the point in the proceedings where
settlement occurs. Where there have been underlying judicial
findings of discrimination, some courts offer more deference to
such a record as support for affirmative action efforts.122 Simi117. See, e.g., Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 925 (9th Cir. 1991)
(remanding for determination of whether MBEs benefitted were limited to those who
had suffered to effects of past discrimination within King County).
118. See, e.g., Main Line Paving Co. v. Board of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 1349, 1361-62
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (overturning program, in part, because of school board's failure to attempt race-neutral means to overcome the effects of discrimination).
119. [d. (finding program overbroad because it did not provide for individualized
determination that MBEs included in the preference were victims of past discrimination
and virtually no waivers of set-aside had ever been granted); cf. Cone Corp. v. Florida
Dep't of Transp., 908 F.2d 908, 916-17 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding program appropriately
narrowed because, inter alia, waiver available and benefit targeted to groups most likely
still suffering the effects of discrimination).
120. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 428 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (finding program flawed for failure to include sunset provision).
121. Cf. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Coalition, 950 F.2d 1401, 1417-18
(9th Cir. 1991) (finding burden on non minorities is slight, especially where their participation in preference is possible via joint ventures with MBEs); Concrete Gen. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 779 F. Supp. 370, 380-81 (D. Md. 1991) (finding program not appropriately tailored where failure to justify the use of the more intrusive
means of restricted bidding for MBEs over less intrusive means, such as waiver of bonding and experience requirements for MBEs).
122. See, e.g., Billish v. City of Chicago, 962 F.2d 1269, 1282 (7th Cir. 1992), reargued en bane, opinion vacated, 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding heightened judicial
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larly, to the extent there is judicial involvement in fashioning or
approving an affirmative action remedy, more deference may be
accorded by a reviewing court regarding the tailoring of the remedy.123 Of course, where there has been no underlying litigation
prompting adoption of an affirmative action hiring or promotion
plan, review of the plan should be like the review accorded setaside plans, as explored above.
The First Circuit reviewed a challenge to affirmative action
measures undertaken pursuant to a consent decree in Stuart u.
Roache,I2' where nonminority police officers challenged the continued adherence to a pre-Croson consent decree favoring promotion of minority officers on the basis of race. The consent decree had been entered in 1980, settling a claim that previous
discrimination in hiring and use of a racially biased promotional
exam resulted in an almost entirely white force at the sergeant
level. l211 The decree required the department to adopt validated
non-discriminatory promotional tools and to make appointments
to overcome the underutilization of minorities as sergeants, setting an ultimate goal of having nine percent Black sergeants by
1985. 126 By 1985, a validated fair exam had not been adopted,
and the decree was extended to 1990. 127 In 1990, only one validated fair exam had been administered and the nine percent
goal had not been reached, so the decree was extended until one
more fair exam could be administered and the goal for minority
oversight of consent decree not dispositive, but helpful to ensure that action is based on
an appropriate remedial purpose and that the means are narrowly tailored); Freeman v.
City of Philadelphia, 751 F. Supp. 509, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aft'd. mem., 947 F.2d 935 (3d
Cir. 1991) (holding that in context of approval of a consent decree implementing a preferential hiring policy, the court did not require as strong a showing of a statistical imbalance as would be needed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination).
123. See, e.g., Mackin v. City of Boston, 969 F.2d 1273 (1st Cir. 1992) (reviewing a
challenge to continued adherence to a 1974 consent decree requiring an eligibility preference for minority firefighters, the First Circuit deferred to the district court's determination that, although a race-neutral exam was adopted in 1987 and 1989 hiring of minorities was in greater proportion than their 1974 representation in the general population,
continued affirmative action was necessary and the decree was sufficiently tailored in
that it provided only a limited advantage to only qualified minorities for a limited period
of time, with little disturbance to the expectations of nonminorities).
124. Stuart, 951 F.2d 446 (1st. Cir. 1991).
125. [d. At that point, only one of 222 sergeanta (0.45 percent) was Black, though
Blacks represented 5.5 percent of the police force and 20 percent of the general population. In 1971, there had been a court determination that the city discriminated against
Blacks at the entry level for the police force. [d.
126. [d.
127. [d.
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representation was raised to 15.5 percent since it was estimated
that twenty percent of the promotion eligible force would be
Black. 128 The court upheld use of the plan, finding that the appropriate statistical comparison l29 yielded a prima facie case of
discrimination, augmented by the earlier findings that discrimination in the entry level exam had further lowered the pool of
Blacks eligible for promotion. 130 Likewise, the court found the
plan narrowly tailored since it benefitted only the pool of qualified minorities, the goals were linked to the size of that pool, the
advantage was limited and of small impact on nonminorities, the
duration was limited, and race-neutral alternatives would not be
effective. 131
In Crumpton u. Bridgeport Education Association, the Second Circuit had to address the much thornier issue involved in
an attempt to add a preferential lay-off policy to an existing affirmative action hiring policy developed pursuant to a consent
decree. 132 The underlying class action suit, alleging segregation
in the Bridgeport school system, was never litigated; the parties
entered into a consent decree requiring, inter alia, an affirmative
minority teacher recruitment program. 133 The court then approved a hiring plan that required the city to use its best efforts
to hire minority teachers at a rate at least equal to that for
nonminority teachers until the percentage of Black and Hispanic
teachers was equal to the proportionate representation of those
groups in the area workforce. 134 When lay-offs of tea~hers later
became necessary, the city sought and obtained district court
approval of an interpretation of the hiring plan to impose an
absolute preference for the retention of minority teachers.1311 On
review, the Second Circuit refused to accept the parties' stipulations as to prior discrimination in the school system as providing
128. [d.

129. The court noted that this comparison between the numbers of minorities promoted and the numbers of minorities eligible for promotion was appropriate, contrasting
it with the statistical comparison made in Croson. The court specifically noted that it
would not be appropriate to compare the number of minority promotions to the number
of minorities who passed the test since the problem was that the test unfairly disqualified minorities. [d. at 450-51.
130. [d. at 452.
131. [d. at 453-55.
132. Crumpton, 993 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1993).
133. [d. at 1025. The consent decree was entered in 1979. [d.
134. [d. at 1026.
135. I d. at 1.027.
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an adequate basis upon which the city could deem the preferential lay-off policy as necessary to remedy the identified effects of
past discrimination. 136 The court went on to. conclude that the
proposed modification to the plan also failed in that the absolute
preference imposed far too harsh a burden on nonminorities. 137
The Third Circuit summarily affirmed the district court's
approval of a consent decree allowing for out of rank order hiring of minority police officers, pending adoption of a valid exam,
in Freeman u. City of Philadelphia. 13s The decree settled an underlying claim that the written exam administered for police recruits discriminated against Blacks, and capped a series of lawsuits charging discrimination in various parts of the police
recruitment process. 139 The test results did show a disparate impact on Blacks, particularly when those passing the test were
rank ordered. 140 There was no evidence that the test had been
validated and, in fact, anecdotal evidence indicated that the test
was not an effective predictor of job performance. l41 The order
forbade the certification of an eligibility list based on test results
if Blacks had a pass rate significantly lower than that of other
racial groups or if the percentage of Blacks in the top 1000
names on the list was significantly less than the percentage of
Blacks who passed the test, unless the court certified that the
test was a valid indicator of job performance, or the city appointed Blacks from the list in proportion to their pass rate on
the test. l42 The district court found that manifest racial imbalance, sufficient to establish a disparate impact, warranted the
approval of the affirmative action measure, particularly since the
136. [d. at 1028. The court specifically noted that the stipulation of facts was not
equivalent to a judicial determination that prior discrimination existed in the school system. [d.
137. [d. at 1030-31. Because of a provision in the contract between the city and the
teachers' union agreeing that lay-off policies should be modified to preserve gains made
under the affirmative action hiring plan, the Second Circuit intimated that a less drastic
lay-off preference, such as one maintaining the proportional representation of minorities,
could pass muster. [d. at 1026, 1031.
138. Freeman, 751 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd. mem., 947 F.2d 935 (3rd Cir.
1991).
139. [d. at 511.
140. [d. at 513-14. White applicants were significantly disproportionately represented in the highest ranks. [d.
141. [d. at 515.
142. Freeman, 751 F. Supp. at 512. The city was also charged with soliciting alternative valid testing ideas. [d.
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measure addressed the problem, imposing little hardship on
nonminorities, and would be temporary pending adoption of a
validated exam. 143
Maryland Troopers Association, Inc. v. Evans involved a
challenge to a consent decree under which the Maryland State
Police agreed to hire and promote Black troopers in specified
percentages. 144 The decree at issue settled a lawsuit alleging
ongoing racial discrimination in the hiring and promotion of
troopers.1411 The evidentiary basis for the design and approval of
the decree consisted of a report citing cronyism within the Maryland State Police as a culprit in the low representation of
Blacks in the upper ranks of the force and a statistical comparison showing a disparity between the percentage of Blacks in the
various ranks of the force and the representation of Black Maryland residents working in jobs with equivalent job skills. 146 The
Fourth Circuit found this evidence void of any showing that the
state had engaged in discrimination justifying the race-based
preference. It rejected the attempt to equate cronyism with racism and it refused to infer that discrimination, rather than a
preference among Blacks for non-police work, accounted for disparities in the proffered statistical comparisons of numbers of
Blacks in various ranks and numbers of Blacks in "equivalent"
143. [d. at 516-19. The court actually treated this as a voluntary affirmative action
undertaking, distinguishing between the discretion permitted for volitional behavior of
an employer and need for a finding of misconduct to support the coercive power of a
court. [d. at 516. The court also noted that the plan at issue here did not interfere with
nonminorities' interests since no-one has a vested interest in being hired on the basis of
performance on an unvalidated exam. [d. at 518.
144. Maryland Troopers Assoc., 993 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1993). The overall goal was
22 percent representation for Blacks. The decree did not require the hiring or promotion
of anyone not otherwise qualified. [d. at 1075.
145. In an earlier case, the United States had sued Maryland for racial discrimination in the hiring of state troopers. That litigation was resolved by a consent decree
setting a goal of achieving overall representation of 16 percent Black troopers in five
years. Later changes in the terms of the decree led to adoption of a plan setting numerical hiring and promotion goals to be effective until a non-biased process was implemented. Under that plan, the percentage of Black troopers hired and promoted increased. [d. at 1072-75. The decree at issue in the instant case arose from a suit filed
later.
146. Id. at 1073-76. Census data was used to identify the percentage of Blacks employed in jobs deemed by the Coalition of Black Maryland State Troopers (plaintiffs in
the underlying lawsuit) and the Maryl~nd State Police to have equivalent skills to particular positions within the force. At the entry level, the comparison was made to the
percentage of Black Maryland residents who met the minimum qualifications for a state
trooper, i.e. 20-58 years old, with a high school diploma. [d. at 1075-76.
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jobs, absent some individual complaints of discriminatory
treatment. 147
The Sixth Circuit has had several occasions to address the
constitutional requirements for public sector affirmative action.
In Long v. City of Saginaw, former police officers challenged an
amendment to the city's affirmative action plan that authorized
hiring of new minority officers at the expense of recalling furloughed officers. 148 The underlying affirmative action plan was
adopted in 1974 in response to a report by the Human Relations
Commission that minorities were underutilized in various city
departments, including the police department, and imposed an
80 percent minority hiring goal for the police department. 149 Due
to a lack of hiring and unsuccessful efforts to recruit minorities,
the percentage of Blacks on the force remained very low. Facing
first a moratorium on new hiring, and later lay-offs, the city and
the police officers' union entered into an agreement overriding
vested seniority rights in order to supplant recalls with new minority hires.l6O This court focused on the second prong of strict
scrutiny analysis and found the burden here imposed on nonminorities too burdensome. un Especially in view of the fact that
there was no evidence of discrimination-based complaints or litigation justifying the remedial relief, less intrusive means, such
as preferential hiring, were all that the court would permit to
meet the city's goals of increasing minority representation on
the police force. 1112
Vogel v. City of Cincinnati involved another affirmative action plan adopted to increase minority representation in the police force, although this plan was adopted pursuant to entry of a
consent decree settling a discrimination claim brought against
the city by the Justice Department.lII3 At that time, 33.7 percent
147. [d. at 1077-78. The court discounted the proffered statistics because it found
no gross disparity, thus leaving open the possibility that qualified Blacks simply preferred non-police work, and because there was no corroboration of the statistical disparity with anecdotal evidence of individual experiences of discrimination. [d. at 1077. Because of its conclusion that the affirmative action plan was not justified by the record,
the court never reached the issue of whether the plan was narrowly tailored.
148. Long, 911 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1990).
.
149. [d. at 1194.
150. [d. at 1195.
. 151. [d. at 1196-97.
152. [d. at 1197.
153. Vogel, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 86 (1992). The de-
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of the applicants for positions on the force were Black, though
only 20.4 percent of the appointments made were Blacks, and
only 9.9 percent of officers on the force were Black while the city
population was twenty-four percent Black. ltl4 The ultimate goal
of the decree was minority representation on the force proportionate to minority representation in the qualified labor pool,
and an interim goal was set to hire minorities in at least the
percentage they represented in the current recruit class. 11I1I The
decree required no unnecessary hiring and no hiring of less qualified persons as evaluated according to properly validated selection devices, and would terminate when the ultimate goal was
reached. 11I6 The court accepted the statistiCal comparisons relating specifically to the Cincinnati police force and to the applicant pool rather than general population figures as giving the
city a strong basis for concluding that remedial action was necessary.11I7 It also found the goals, set according to the minority
representation achieved after affirmative recruitment efforts,
provided a sufficient link between the remedy and the identified
discrimination. IllS
The dissolution of a consent decree implementing an affirmative action plan was appealed in Jansen v. City of Cincinnati. 11I9 In the decree, resolving claims of racial discrimination in
hiring for firefighter positions, the city agreed to pursue a goal of
achieving 18 percent minority representation in its overall
workforce,160 subject to the availability of qualified minorities,
with one measure of effort requiring at least 40 percent minorities in the firefighters recruit class. 161 The city implemented the
decree by using dual hiring lists, by race, for all recruits successcree also covered women, but that aspect of the plan is omitted from the discussion here.
154. Id. at 600.
155. Id. at 596. The 1980 recruit class was 34 percent minorities as the result of
recent recruiting efforts. I d.
156. [d.
157. Id. at 600-01.
158. Id.
159. Jansen, 977 F.2d 238 (6th Cir. 1992), reh'g. en bane denied, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 34153 (6th Cir. Dec. 29, 1992), eert. denied, 124 L.Ed.2d 254, 1993 U.S. LEXIS
3262 (1993).
160. The 18 percent minority representation was reached in 1986. Jansen, 977 F.2d
at 241.
161. Id. at 240. The decree set out hiring goals by percentage goals and target dates
(1974-1980). Id.
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fully completing all phases of the recruitment process. 162 The
Sixth Circuit found that a manifest racial imbalance justified the
1974 decree, and that changes in the city's racial composition,
together with new claims of discrimination brought in 1990 prevented the challengers from carrying their burden of negating
the inference of discrimination. 163 The use of dual hiring lists
passed the "narrowly tailored" test since the written exams used
by the department had never been validated, except as ensuring
minimum qualifications, the exam was only one of five qualification factors, and failure to use dual lists would have resulted in a
significant underrepresentation of minorities. 164
The Seventh Circuit case of Billislz, v. City of Chicago consolidated review. of two cases involving affirmative action hiring
and promotion programs adopted in conjunction with consent
decrees settling claims of racial discrimination in the city's fire
department. 166 A 1974 consent decree established an interim 50
percent minority hiring goal and a long range goal of increasing
minority representation in the fire department to approximate
minority representation in the general population. 166 The other
decree capped a series of challenges to the city's promotional
exam, and imposed an interim one minority to four nonminority
hiring ratio in mid-rank positions, with a long term goal of
bringing minority representation in higher ranks into parity with
minority representation in lower ranks. 167 Minority promotions
162. [d. Civil service rules also permitted hiring by the "rule of three," allowing any
one of the top three candidates to be hired. [d. at 240-41.
163. [d. at 244-45. Though the goal of 18 percent minority representation in the
department overall had been reached, the decree had not set a maximum goal, and the
court refused to interpret the decree as inferring that minority representation beyond 18
percent would not raise an inference of discrimination in hiring. [d. at 244.
164. [d. at 243-44.
165. Billish, 962 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1992), reargued en banc and opinion vacated,
989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1993).
166. Billish, 962 F.2d at 1273. At the time the decree was entered, there was only
five percent minority representation in the fire department. General population figures
were used for comparison because entering firefighters needed no special training or academic achievement. Since little hiring had been done through 1978, and minority representation was only nine percent, the order was extended to 1980. In 1979, a new eligibility list was adopted. If the list was used for more than two years or 500 hires, 50 percent
of further hiring was to be minority hires. [d.
167. [d. at 1273-74. The decree authorized expansion of the candidate pool by lowering the passing grade cut-off, and included goals of redesigning the promotion procedure to eliminate disparate impact and providing training to those seeking promotions.
These goals were included in the collective bargaining agreement between the city and
the firefighters. [d. at 1274-75.
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were made out of rank order on the basis of this affirmative action plan. 166 The Seventh Circuit panel found that the statistical
evidence of discrimination underlying the consent decrees
helped establish the need for remedial relief,169 and that the city
was justified in concluding that affirmative action was still necessary to comply with the underlying decree because of continuing problems attaining increased minority representation in the
upper ranks of the department. 17O In the aggregate, the panel
concluded that the city had a strong basis for concluding that its
hiring and promotion policies were necessary.171 It similarly
found the more recent promotion plan narrowly tailored in that
promotions out of rank order were only made where no alternative would work. 172 The goals were flexible, limited, and reasonably related to the relevant labor market,173 and the impact on
nonminorities was minimal. 17• Subsequently, the Seventh Cir168. Id. at 1275-76. Regarding 1986 promotions made on the basis of the 1979 eligibility list, the first eighteen promotions of lieutenants to captains, made in rank order,
went to white firefighters. Two minority firefighters were promoted after the cut-off score
was lowered. The personnel department certified the lower ranked minorities as qualified
based on additional experience. The test had not been validated, and expert testimony
indicated that it would not be possible to validate the test. Id. at 1275. Regarding 1987
promotions to the rank of engineer, made on the basis of the newer eligibility list, the
last eight of fifty-six promotions were minorities out of rank order. Id. at 1276. Later
promotions to captain, based on the new captain eligibility list, included one out of rank
order promotion based on race. Id.
169. Id. at 1283-84. The court noted that the heightened judicial oversight involved
in a consent decree helps to ensure that race-conscious action is based on an appropriate
remedial purpose and that the action is narrowly tailored to further that purpose. Id. at
1282. The court also approved of the statistical comparison relied upon, comparing minority representation in each rank against minority representation in the rank below,
from which promotions are drawn. Id. at 1284.
170. Jansen, 977 F.2d at 1282-83.
171. Id. at 1289.
172. Since promotions to a higher rank were only made from the rank below, other
mechanisms, such as increasing recruitment efforts, were not available. Id. at 1290.
173. Firefighters had to meet minimum qualifications to get a job, the preferential
promotional scheme was limited to three years or a shorter duration during which the
goals were attained, and it was realistic to tie the goals to the percentage of minorities in
the ranks below, from which promotions were to be drawn. Id.
174. Id. at 1291. Nonminorities have no vested right to rank order promotions, and
Croson merely requires that those benefitted by affirmative action be members of the
group(s) who suffered the effects of prior discrimination. [d. at 1291-92. The court re,
manded the Billish case (involving the claim based on out of rank hiring from the 1979
captain eligibility list). C{. Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local No.2 v. Washington, 736
F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (involving out of rank order promotions from the 1986
engineer eligibility list and the 1987 captain eligibility list, here approved by the Seventh
Circuit) for reconsideration of the equal protection claim because the district court had
not applied strict scrutiny in deciding that issue. Id. at 1302. Since the evidence justify,
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cuit, en bane, vacated the panel opinion and remanded the case
for development of the record and trial of the issues of whether
the affirmative action efforts were justified on the basis of past
discrimination and necessary because of continuing discriminatory effect.1711
A consent decree settling extensive, long term litigation concerning discrimination on the basis of sex and race in the city's
fire department was subject to challenge in Davis v. City &
County of San Franeiseo. 176 Several earlier lawsuits involved
disparate impact claims regarding the department's entry-level
and promotional exams, which had never been validated.177 Litigation underlying the consent decree at issue alleged continued
adverse impact on minorities regarding the city's most recently
adopted entrance and promotional exams.178 The Ninth Circuit
,found that the statistical disparities, sufficient to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, were sufficiently probative of discrimination in the context of non-skilled
entry-level employment, and that the department workforce,
from which promotions were drawn, was the appropriate comparison group for targeting minority representation goals for
promotion. 179 Likewise, except for needing addition of a sunset
provision, the court deemed the program narrowed to permit
flexible goals,180 reasonably related to the relevant labor force,181
ing the city's remedial action would parallel that approved in the Chicago Fire Fighters
case, the focus on review was to be whether the granting of out of rank promotions from
the earlier eligibility list was also narrowly tailored to the city's remedial purpose, [d. at
1301.
175. Billish, 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir, 1993). One issue prompting the remand was focused on whether the department should have delayed making the out of rank order
hires until the results of a new, validated exam, expected to be available within months,
were indeed available.
176. Davis, 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989). On the union's subsequent appeal of this
case, the court determined that the union lacked standing to appeal since no member it
represented had suffered an injury in fact, See United States v. City and County of San
Francisco, 979 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1992).
177. Davis, 890 F.2d at 1442-43, This case refers to the district court case, 696 F.
Supp, 1287 (N.D. Cal. 1988), for a complete history of the underlying litigation, What
becomes obvious from a quick review of this history is that continued attempts to adopt
a valid, non-discriminatory exam were unsuccessful.
178. 890 F.2d at 1443-44.
179. [d. at 1447.
180. [d. Referring to the district court's analysis of the tailoring of the remedy, see
United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 696 F. Supp. 1287, 1309 (N,D, Cal.
1988) (holding only qualified minorities were to be hired or promoted, adjustment of
goals was contemplated for changes in circumstances, and a waiver was included),
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and not unduly burdensome to nonminorities. 182
In Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission, the
Ninth Circuit approved of the practice of banding scores from a
police department promotional exam in order to increase the
number of minorities promoted. 18s A prior consent decree settling race and sex discrimination claims had set target minority
appointment goals based on minority representation in the qualified applicant pool, with an ultimate goal of 45 percent minority
representation within the department. 184 The court deemed the
evidence of past discrimination supporting the original consent
decree, augmented by a continued adverse impact in the most
recent exam, enough to provide a strong basis for concluding
that the effects of discrimination continued to exist, and that
use of banding, with consideration of selection factors in addition to race, was an allowable mechanism to address that
discrimination. 181!
On remand from the Eleventh Circuit, a district court in
Florida reconsidered a constitutional challenge to an affirmative
action program permitting preferential hiring of women and minorities in light of Croson.1 86 In 1983, the fire department found
that its workforce had a significant underrepresentation of minorities and women as compared with representation of those
181. Davis, 890 F.2d at 1447, referring to 696 F. Supp. at 1310. The goals for minority representation at the unskilled, entry level were far below the percentage representation of these groups in the local population, and the figures for promotion were not out
of line with the numbers of minorities in the force, from which promotions would be
drawn.
182. Davis, 890 F.2d at 1447, referring to 696 F. Supp. at 1310. Nonminorities still
had ample opportunity to be hired and promoted.
183. Officers for Justice, 979 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1992). Banding of scores allows the
city/county to treat scores within a set range as substantially equivalent. In this case,
race would be a factor of selection from within a particular band. Id. at 724.
184. [d. at 723. The Ninth Circuit noted that the earlier case was based on an undisputed history of discrimination. The decree also prohibited the use of unvalidated discriminatory selection procedures. [d. In an earlier decision, the court had disapproved of
a scoring system that changed the relative weight given different components of the
exam in order to minimize disparate impact. San Francisco Police Officer's Ass'n, 869
F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989).
185. Officers for Justice, 979 F.2d at 726-27. The court found that the evidence was
enough to constitute a prima facie case of discrimination, and that the commission need
not first prove the exam invalid in order to justify the use of race as a plus factor in an
affirmative action program. Id.
186. Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 815 F. Supp. 1454 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
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groups in the local population. I87 In response, the department
began ranking applicant groups separately based on race and
sex, and hired in accordance with numerical goals calculated on
the basis of the number of openings expected, the expected
number of qualified applicants in each race/sex grouping, and
the extent of underrepresentation in each category.I88 At trial on
remand, the department augmented the evidentiary basis for the
program by showing that it had made race-neutral attempts to
increase minority representation with only limited success, that
evaluation of test scores of applicants still showed that of those
passing the entry-level test, non minorities were significantly
overrepresented in the top scorers, and that several of the selection procedures had an adverse impact on minorities but could
not be validated to predict future job performance. I89 The court
found this evidence, sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because comparison to general population figures
was appropriate for these entry-level firefighter positions, a
strong basis for the remedial action. 190 Because the department
187. In 1983, the fire department workforce of 921 was seventy-five percent white,
though whites represented only forty-seven percent of the population, twelve percent
Black, though Blacks represented seventeen percent of the population, fourteen percent
Hispanic, though Hispanics represented thirty-six percent of the population, and one
percent female, though females represented fifty-two percent of the population. The disparities in prior years were similar or more magnified. [d. at 1458.
188. [d. at 1458. A particular race/sex group was deemed to be significantly underrepresented if representation of members of the group in the fire department was less
than 70 percent of the group's representation in the general (local) population. The long
term goal of the program was to relieve underrepresentation of these groups in the department. The preferential hiring was to end when a significant disparity no longer existed. [d.
189. [d. at 1458-60. The department produced testimony about active minority recruitment efforts prior to adoption of the program, statistics showing that representation
of minorities in the top 100 scorers on the test were 4.8 standard deviations from expected, different pass rates for whites, Blacks, Hispanics, and women (85%, 56%, 23%,
42%, respectively) on the written test, and physical test components unrelated to
fire fighting (i.e. swimming). The department also pointed to settlement of earlier litigation which required it to validate its selection procedures and to recruit Blacks. [d. at
1460-61.
190. [d. at 1462-64. The court acknowledged that entry-level firefighters had to meet
some other qualificatio.ns, such as passing a vision test, but found that these specifics
would be impossible to account for statistically. Absent challengers' ability to show that
consideration of such factors would be possible and would significantly change the statistical comparison, comparison to general population figures would be allowed here. [d. at
1464. The court noted that settlement of the past litigation and anecdotal evidence of
discrimination, alone, would not be enough to justify this affirmative action program, but
are useful in supporting the justification based on statistical disparities. [d. at 1465. The
court also specifically allowed consideration of evidence produced after implementation
of the program to subsequently justify adoption of the program. [d. at 1466.
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had attempted some race-neutral alternative, set flexible goals
linked to the relevant labor market, limited benefits of the program to qualified minorities, incorporated a provision for termination upon achievement of its goals, and was of limited impact
on the rights of nonminorities, its program was sufficiently tailored to the allowable remedial purpose.1 91

V. A PATTERN OF BETTER SUCCESS?
It is clear that state and local affirmative action programs in
employment settings have been far less vulnerable to successful
attack under the strict scrutiny standard. Part of the explanation, as noted earlier, is rooted in the fact that the genesis for
many of these programs is a consent decree settling charges of
discrimination against the acting entity. This provides a direct
link between the existence and effects of the alleged discrimination. In those cases where the underlying allegations of discrimination have been substantiated by a court, or at least subjected
to some judicial scrutiny, other courts have been willing to accept that discrimination as sufficient evidence to support the entity's resort to race-specific remedial action. 192 However, where
proceedings have not progressed to the point where there has
been judicial analysis of the underlying claims, courts reviewing
the resultant programs have been unwilling to condone establishment of affirmative action programs based on mere assertions of discrimination. 193
Whatever record has been produced to substantiate the
charges of discrimination in the underlying suit also serves to
provide the link between the challenged conduct and the racespecific effect, particularly where the conduct may appear to be
race-neutral. The record, containing allegations of individual experiences of discrimination and/or patterns of discriminatory
impact, is then available to support the choice of remedy as nec191. [d. at 1466·71.
192. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. Not only can judicial review give
independent credence to allegations of discrimination, where the record relating to
charges of discrimination is developed, a pattern of disparate impact.may also be sub·
stantiated. [d.
193. See, e.g., Crumpton v. Bridgeport Educ. Ass'n., 993 F.2d 1023 (2nd Cir. 1993)
(refusing to equate parties' stipulations as to existence of discrimination with judicial
determination that such discrimination existed.)
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essary to counter the identified discriminatory effects.
Another problem associated with many set-aside programs,
which tends to be eliminated in the context of affirmative action
programs adopted pursuant to consent decrees, is the problem of
overinclusiveness. While set-aside programs are generally
adopted in a proactive attempt to address discrimination, they
tend to expand coverage to include all "marginal" groups. Affirmative action programs adopted in response to particular
charges of discrimination tend to focus reaction on the specific
group(s) making the charges. Thus, they are not often vulnerable to charges of overbreadth.
In this light, the apparent increased approval for state and
local affirmative action programs in employment is not really inconsistent with the results of challenges to set-aside programs. 194
Thus, examination and comparison of the features of various
state and local affirmative action employment plans yields a similar measure of constitutional soundness. Again, a strong and
relevant statistical showing of underrepresentation of minorities,
augmented by experiences of the individuals alleging discrimination, is a requisite to success. 19!\ Affirmative action goals extending beyond the remedy justified on the basis of the underlying lawsuit must be independently justified. 196 Goals must
194. This statement is not intended to contradict the difference in burdens of proof
for those chall.enging a program adopted by a legislative body versus a court approved
consent decree. Croson clearly imposed the burden of proving the existence of local effects of discrimination justifying race-conscious action upon the entity undertaking such
action. In contrast, challengers bear the burden of disproving underlying claims of discrimination relied upon by a court in approving remedial action based thereon. This
difference may account for some difference in the strength of statistical data necessary to
meet the required justification for race-conscious relief.
195. Cf, Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 815 F. Supp. 1454, 1457-58 (S.D.
Fla. 1993) (finding program justified by significant statistical disparities between representation of various groups in unskilled entry-level firefighter positions and representation of those groups in general population, documented over a seven year period); Maryland Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting statistical
comparison of numbers of Blacks at various levels on police force with numbers of
Blacks in "equivalent skilled jobs" in the absence of reference to specific complaints of
discriminatory treatment).
196. Cf, Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 448 (1st Cir. 1991) (allowing extension of
decree, and modification of minority promotion goal, based on evidence of change in
racial composition of relevant labor pool); Long v. City of Saginaw, 911 F.2d 1192, 1197
(6th Cir. 1990) (adopting agreement calling for new minority hires to displace furloughed
nonminority officers subject to recall impermissible not justified by evidence of department's discrimination).
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reasonably relate to dismantling the identified discrimination
and must be limited by the availability of qualified minority
group members.I97 Goals must also avoid placing undue burdens
on nonminorities. I98 Finally, the program must provide for its
termination upon achievement of its goals. I99
VI.

CONCLUSION

Despite an apparent variation in the federal courts' willingness to approve state and local affirmative action plans in employment settings versus state and local minority set-aside programs, this review of cases indicates that the same basic
parameters define a constitutionally acceptable program of either type. 200 Lower federal courts applying Croson are closely
scrutinizing the evidence relied upon to justify state and local
resort to race-based affirmative action, as well as the design of
the affirmative action program in relation to that evidence.
Courts are requiring the acting entity to establish the existence
of an underrepresentation of minorities in a given arena based
upon a statistical disparity between the local availability of
qualified minorities and the rate of their participation in the
arena. Courts are further requiring substantiation of a discriminatory reason for the underrepresentation with individual accounts of experiences of discrimination. This record then provides the measure for the scope of permissible action. The
program and goals adopted must relate directly to overcoming
the documented underrepresentation in the manner least intrusive to nonminority interests. Clearing these rather high hurdles
has proven more difficult for entities undertaking proactive at197. Cf. Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 454 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding minority promotion goals appropriately linked to pool of qualified minorities); Maryland Troopers Ass'n
v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1077 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that goal must be reasonably related to minority representation in qualified labor pool, not to representation in general
population).
198. Cf. Crumpton v. Bridgeport Educ. Ass'n, 993 F.2d 1023, 1031 (2nd Cir. 1993)
(finding preferential lay-off policy too burdensome on nonminorities); Freeman v. City of
Philadelphia, 751 F. Supp. 509, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd memo 947 F.2d 935 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding out of rank order hiring does not unnecessarily trammel rights/expectations of nonminorities).
199. See, e.g., Davis V. City & County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438, 1447 (9th
Cir. 1989) (finding program was tailored to its authorized remedial purpose, but required
addition of sunset provision). Of course, consent decrees are subject to continued judicial
oversight during their life.
200. See supra notes 111-121, 192-199 and accompanying text.
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tempts to address local discrimination than for entities adopting
affirmative action in response to legal claims of discrimination .
. However, this review additionally shows that, in spite of the
increasing hostility toward race-based affirmative action,201 affirmative action programs carefully crafted in response to specific local experiences of discrimination will pass muster under
challenge. 202 Although one may take issue with the motivation
for imposition of the more restrictive analysis regarding these
programs, the consequent imposition of requirements that a specific, local factual study of existing effects of discrimination support adoption of the program, and that the design of the program effectively addresses the findings of such a study, may at
least help alter general attitudes toward affirmative action. At
least one widely held belief, that affirmative action programs
merely grant gratuitous benefits to (often unqualified) minorities, fails in the face of the strict scrutiny standard as announced
and applied under Croson and subsequent cases. Under this analytic framework, though, the next and perhaps more important
step, permitting ·affirmative action efforts based on the goal of
achieving diversity, remains elusive. 203

201. See, e.g., Sylvester Monroe, Does Affirmative Action Help or Hurt?, TIME, May
27, 1991, at 23.
202. See also Joint Statement, Constitutional Scholars' Statement of Affirmative
Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711 (1989).
203. The Croson focus on past discrimination as justification for race-conscious action has been adopted without exception by the lower courts. See, e.g., F. Buddie Contracting Co. v. City of Elyria, 773 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (finding set-aside
adopted for purpuses of promoting general welfare and avoiding future discrimination
failed because it was not adopted in response to findings of past or present discrimination); see also supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text. This narrow focus ignores the
compelling societal interest in some circumstances to legislate to achieve equal results
rather than merely equal opportunity. This interest may stem from a simple need for
diversity to achieve equality, such as a need to have teacher/role models representing the
student constituencies of a school, or may arise from the awareness that the substantive
values pervading the "procedural" mechanisms of equal opportunity are too far ingrained to be fully eradicated. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729,
1735-45 (1989). Justice Stevens, and now Justice Ginsburg, have specifically recognized
the potential of justifying public sector affirmative action programs with a goal of achieving diversity. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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